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Abstract
The treatment of systematic errors is often mishandled. This is due to lack of under-
standing and education, based on a fundamental ambiguity as to what is meant by the
term. This note addresses the problems and offers guidance to good practice.
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1. RIVAL DEFINITIONS: UNCERTAINTY AND MISTAKE
1.1 Random Uncertainties and Mistakes
The word error is used in several ways. The everyday dictionary definition is a syn-
onym for mistake. In statistics this usage continues (as in ‘Type I error’ for the rejection
of a true hypothesis and ‘Type II error’ for the acceptance of a false one) but it is also
used in the sense of discrepancy: the statistician writes the equation of a straight line fit
as yi = mxi + c+ ǫi where ǫi is the ‘error term’, the difference between the measured and
the ideal value.
A physicist does not use this language; their interest is concentrated not on the actual
discrepancy of a single measurement, but on the overall uncertainty. They write a straight
line as yi = mxi + c where the equals sign signifies agreement to some uncertainty (or
resolution) σ, and they will call this the ‘error’. (In early texts this was called the ‘probable
error’ but the ‘probable’ got dropped.) This use of ‘error’ to mean ‘uncertainty’ rather
than ‘mistake’ or ‘discrepancy’ is common in the language, for example ‘error bar’, ‘error
analysis’, and ‘quoted error on the result.’
Suppose a set of measurements have been made of the same quantity, and the values
are
1.23, 1.25, 1.24, 1.25, 1.21, 1.52, 1.22, 1.27
These exhibit some uncertainty in the 3rd decimal place, and a mistake in that one of
the values clearly does not belong with the others.
Statistics provides tools to identify and use the uncertainty. It can be estimated from
the rms deviation of the values about the mean, and then used in specifying the accuracy
of this mean, or of a single measurement, or the number of measurements that would be
needed to achieve some desired accuracy, and so on.
Statistics provides tools to identify a mistake, but not to use it. We can see that the
value of 1.52 is wrong - or, more correctly, that the probability of this value being produced
by a measurement consistent with the others is so small that we reject it. Statistics does
not and cannot tell us what to do next. Perhaps the value is a transcription error for 1.25.
Perhaps it was taken while the apparatus was still warming up. Perhaps it is due to an
unforeseen and Nobel-prize-winning effect. Perhaps it is right and the others are wrong.
What we do next has to be based on experience and common sense, but statistics does not
prescribe it.
1.2 Systematic Uncertainties and Mistakes
For consistency physicists must use systematic error in the same way as random error:
to denote a systematic uncertainty and not a systematic mistake. But consider the following
two definitions
‘Systematic effects is a general category which includes effects such as background,
selection bias, scanning efficiency, energy resolution, angle resolution, variation of counter
efficiency with beam position and energy, dead time, etc. The uncertainty in the estimation
of such a systematic effect is called a systematic error.’ - Orear[1]
‘Systematic Error: reproducible inaccuracy introduced by faulty equipment, calibra-
tion or technique.’ - Bevington[2]
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These are taken from widely read and accepted authors, and each on its own would
probably get a nod of approval from a practising physicist. However putting them together
shows that they are incompatible. The second definition means mistake - the word ‘faulty’
is a key. The first explicitly defines an uncertainty. It does not contain the sense of fault,
blame, or incompetence which is fundamental to the second.
The following examples of ‘systematic error’ show these two usages.
1 The energy E measured in a calorimeter module is given by
E = αD + β,
where D is some digitisation of the recorded output signal. The error (=uncertainty)
on E has a random part due to the random uncertainty on D (from sampling statis-
tics). It has a systematic part due to errors (=uncertainties) on the calibration con-
stants α and β. These are systematic in that from measurement to measurement the
value ofD will fluctuate about its true value with some standard deviation σD, whereas
the values of α and β are constant and their discrepancy is applied systematically to
all measurements.
2 A branching ratio B is calculated from number of observed decays N out of some
total number NT , where the efficiency of detection is η:
B = N/(ηNT ).
There is a statistical Poisson (or perhaps binomial) error on the ratio N/NT which will
fall as more data is gathered. There is an uncertainty on the efficiency η (probably
calculated from Monte Carlo simulation) whose contribution will not (unless other
steps are taken) fall as more data is taken.
3 Measurements are taken with a steel rule. The rule was calibrated at a temperature of
15 C and the measurements are taken in a warmer laboratory, and the experimenter
does not allow for thermal expansion.
4 During the processing of data, numbers are rounded down by omitting all digits after
the decimal point.
The first two examples are systematic errors in Orear’s sense. There is a systematic
effect, encapsulated in α, β, and η, and an uncertainty in that effect, encapsulated in σα,
σβ , and ση. These errors can be handled by standard techniques, as will be described later.
The third and fourth are examples of the second definition, indeed Example 3 is taken
from Bevington; they arise from mistakes. In order to consider how to handle them one
has to specify the situation more precisely (as will be done in what follows.)
For consistency we should use Orear’s definition rather than Bevington’s. In an ideal
world the term ‘systematic error’ might be avoided, and replaced by ‘systematic uncer-
tainty’ but that is unrealistic. It is vital to distinguish systematic effects from the system-
atic errors which are the uncertainties in those effects and from the systematic mistakes
resulting from the neglect of such effects. Confusion between these three concepts is
widespread, and responsible for poor practice.
Of course systematic mistakes still exist, and still need to be identified. But calling
them mistakes makes clear that although statistics can help to find them, it does not
provide tools to tell us what to do with them.
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1.3 Systematic Errors and Bias
The terms ‘bias’ and ‘systematic error’ are treated as synonymous by some authors
[3,4,5]. This is not a full enough definition to be helpful. In discussing a bias one has to
consider its status.
Once a bias is known, it can be corrected for: an estimator with known bias can
be trivially replaced by an unbiassed estimator. If the bias is unknown and unsuspected
then one can by definition do nothing about it. The match between ‘bias’ and ‘systematic
error’ under our definition is the case where a bias is known to exist, but its exact size
(systematic effect) is unknown (systematic uncertainty).
We apply this to the example of measurements with an expanding steel rule.
1 If the expansion coefficient is known, as are the two temperatures of calibration and
actual measurement, then the measurements can be corrected and the bias is removed;
the systematic effect is known exactly and there is no systematic error.
2 If the effect is ignored then this is a mistake. Hopefully consistency checks will be done
and will (through statistical techniques) reveal a discrepancy for which the physicist
will (through common sense, experience and intuition) realise the cause.
3 If the effect is known to exist but the temperature at which the actual measurements
was taken was not recorded, and one can only give the laboratory temperature to
within a few degrees, that is a systematic uncertainty on a systematic effect, and a
systematic error in the accepted sense.
2. SYSTEMATIC ERRORS CAN BE BAYESIAN
A random uncertainty fits neatly into the frequentist definition of probability. In
considering a large ensemble of measurements, different results are obtained. One can
speak of the probability of a particular result as the limit of a fraction of measurements
giving that result. But if a measurement with a systematic uncertainty is repeated then,
by definition, the same result is obtained every time, giving an ensemble of identical results
which cannot be used to say anything about probability.
In some cases there is a clear way out. The calibration of a calorimeter, for example,
may be determined through a separate experiment; the ensemble to be considered is then
the ensemble of calibration experiments, rather than the ensemble of actual measurements.
A resistor with value 100 ± 10 Ω used in voltage and current measurements will always
have the same value (of, perhaps, 106 Ω) but it came from a drawer full of nominal 100 Ω
resistors with a spread of values.
In some cases there is no escape. This occurs particularly for so-called ‘theory errors’.
For example, consider the determination of luminosity in e+e− collisions through measuring
small angle Bhabha scatters. Perhaps the cross section has been calculated to third order in
the fine structure constant α. It is inaccurate in that it deviates from the exact expression.
Yet a different calculation will always gives same result. One can guess at this inaccuracy:
setting it to a few times α4 would be sensible. But there is no (obvious) ensemble to use.
To quote a figure for an uncertainty in such a situation requires one to use a subjective
(Bayesian) definition of probability.
Even for a practitioner who generally uses and advocates a frequentist definition of
probability, there are times when the Bayesian definition has to be invoked. This can be
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excused when a particular systematic error is (as it usually is) a small part of the total
error. In doing so it is important that one is aware of what one is doing, and the possible
pitfalls.
2.1 Prior pitfalls: an illustration
These dangers appear in a recent example [6]. Consider an experiment where limits
are obtained on some quantity R (perhaps a branching ratio or cross section) from some
observed number of events n. This was considered by Cousins and Highland [7] who wrote
n = SR
where S is the ‘sensitivity’ factor, containing factors such as the detection efficiency, and
therefore has some associated uncertainty σS which is probably Bayesian. The limits on
R are compounded from the statistical (Poisson) variation on n and the variation in S.
Consider a particular value of R as an upper limit: the confidence level can be computed
by repeatedly taking that value, multiplying it by a value drawn from Gauss(S, σS), and
using that as the mean for generation of a Poisson random number. The fraction of times
that this value is less than or equal to the observed n gives the confidence level for this
value of R. R can then be adjusted and the process repeated till the desired confidence
level is attained. This can be done using approximate analytical formulae [7] or by a toy
Monte Carlo [6,7]
However it would be equally valid to write [8]
R = An
where the appropriate factor A is merely the inverse of S. A trivial change. And yet if
one applies the same proportional uncertainty to S and to A one gets different results.
For example, suppose 3 events are observed, and you have an uncertainty of 10% on S or
A, which are both taken as 1, and consider R = 5. The probability of 3 events or less is
27.2% from the first method but 26.6% from the second. The results are different because
the priors are different; a Gaussian in S is not the same as a Gaussian in A ≡ 1/S.
A third possibility would be to use a Jeffreys’ prior. The prescription for this is to
effectively transform to a variable for which the Fisher information is flat, and take a
flat prior in that. To call this ‘objective’ is an overstatement, but it does offer a unique
prescription. Here it means working in lnA or equivalently lnS, and generating a Gaussian
in that. This gives a value intermediate between the two others.
The moral is that, as is well known to statisticians, with Bayesian statistics one must
(unless one has some a priori reason for a particular form) investigate the stability of a
result under changes in the prior. This example shows that variation does occur at the
sort of level to which results are generally quoted.
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3. EVALUATING EFFECTS OF SYSTEMATIC UNCERTAINTY
R
a
+- aa σσ
Figure 1: Evaluating the effect of an uncertainty
There is a widespread myth that when errors are systematic, the standard techniques
for errors do not apply, and practitioners follow prescriptions handed down from supervisor
to student. This is not so. The standard undergraduate combination of errors formula still
applies, though one has to be careful to include the correlation terms.
In some cases this is all that is required. If the energy measurement has a systematic
error then the error on, say, an invariant mass made from these quantities can be found in
the standard way. In other cases they cannot. Suppose the experimental result R depends
on some parameter a which is not known exactly, but with some uncertainty σa. This
parameter a could be one that affects the Monte Carlo generation of simulated events used
to extract other quantities in the analysis, which means that the effects of this uncertainty
cannot be followed through combination of errors algebra. Instead one generates samples
at the best value a0, and usually at two other values, a0 + σa and a0 − σa to obtain
R′ = dR
da
, as shown in Figure 1. The quoted result is R(a0), and the error due to the
uncertainty in a is σaR
′ which is the difference in R. (In some cases more points may be
appropriate to investigate possible non-linearity, or different a values to avoid numerical
errors. The choice to evaluate at ±σ is for convenience.) This can be done for the final
result or for some intermediate result which can then be used in a combination of errors
formula. Indeed with today’s processing power this method is generally used rather than
using algebra, as it gets straight to the answer without assumptions about effects being
small.
In some cases this procedure can be simplified: for example if the invariant mass is
used to select pairs of photons in a window near the π0 mass, and the number of these pairs
used to give a further value, then given an uncertain energy scale, one can vary the window
rather than the energy scale by the appropriate amount, and redo only the final part of
the analysis. Note (for future reference) that in such a case the upper and lower edges
of the window are varied together, coherently, and that they are changed by a prescribed
amount.
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3.1 Evaluation: the error on error paradox
Figure 2 Errors on errors
In a typical experiment there may be a large amount of Monte Carlo data generated
at the central value a0, but less at a0± σa. So the estimate of R′ may itself have an error,
σR′ , due to finite Monte Carlo statistics. How does this affect the systematic uncertainty
on R? There are 3 suggestions.
1 σ2 = (R′σa)
2 + (σR′σa)
2
The uncertainty in R′ is another uncertainty so it should be added in quadrature.
2 σ2 = (R′σa)
2 − (σR′σa)2
This value R′ has been modified from true R′ in such a way that 〈R′2〉 is increased. (If
R is independent of a, these errors will force R′ away from zero.) Subtraction in quadrature
compensates for this.
3 σ2 = (R′σa)
2
There is no point messing about with such subtleties. This correction is going to be
small unless both σaR
′ and σ′R/R
′ are large. In that case then to do a decent job on the
measurement you have to go back and generate more Monte Carlo data.
3.1.1 An illustrative example
If the estimate of R′ varies symmetrically about its true value, and there is no reason
to doubt that it does, then the estimate of σ as R′σa is unbiassed. The problem is that
this estimate is incorporated in the total error by addition in quadrature; what matters is
not the standard deviation but the variance. And if our estimate of σ is unbiassed then
our estimate of σ2 is certainly not unbiassed.
To avoid some of the unnecessary complication we consider an illustrative example.
Suppose an integer x is generated with uniform probability over a large range. It is then
either increased or decreased by 1, with equal probability, to give y = x±1. You are given
the value y, and you need the best estimate of x2. (This represents the need to know the
variance rather than the standard deviation.)
There is a (Bayesian) viewpoint which argues: suppose y has a particular value, say
y = 5. This could have come from x = 6 or x = 4, and the probabilities are (by symmetry,
ignorance, etc) equal. Your value of y2 is 25, but the true value is 16 or 36. The midway
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point is 26, and that value will be unbiassed. So add 1 to the value of y2. This is the first
of the 3 methods above.
There is a (frequentist) viewpoint which argues in the reverse direction. Suppose x
has a particular value, say x = 5. This could give y = 4 or y = 6 with equal probability.
The true value of 25 becomes 16 or 36. On average this is 26, so subtract 1 to remove the
bias. This is the second of the 3 methods above.
Algebraically, these two arguments take the two equations
y = x± 1 x = y ∓ 1
square them to get
y2 = x2 ± 2x+ 1 x2 = y2 ∓ 2y + 1
and then argue that one can take the average, which cancels the ± or ∓ term.
We can test these arguments against the special case of zero. Suppose you are given
a y of 0. Argument 1 gives 02 + 1 = 1. Which is spot on, as we know x = −1 or +1 so
x2 = 1 either way. Argument 2 gives 02 − 1 = −1, which looks crazy. How can our ‘best’
estimate of x2 be a negative number?
Continuing the testing, suppose you generate x = 0. This will give y2 = 1 so argument
2 is spot on and argument 1 is out by 2. Argument 1 will never give 0. So argument 2
wins this test, but not so dramatically, as you can never know whether x was zero, but if
y is zero this is obvious.
In resolving a paradox one has to scrutinise the way it is posed, and here the assertion
of a ‘uniform probability over a large range’ is open to question; the nature of this prior
in x affects the Bayesian argument 1 but not the frequentist argument 2. There is no
scale in the original problem concerning R′, so a uniform probability up to a known finite
limit is inadmissable (and would introduce corrections at the limits). You have some belief
about the limits ±L, and you believe x is uniformly generated within these limits. This
combines to give a prior which falls off at large |x|. Your subjective probability of a result
between 2 and 5 is larger than that for 10002 and 10005. Given this fall, higher |x| values
are intrinsically less probable than low ones, so y = 5 must be slightly more likely to have
come from x = 4 than x = 6. Any given y2 value is more likely to be an upward fluctuation
than a downward one. This argument appears inescapable, in that it cannot be deemed
to be small and thus ignored. (If the fall in probability is very slow, then large values are
very probable and the size of the correction increases.)
Thus the logic of argument 1 fails, and we are left with argument 2. This is the
frequentist solution, and this is a valid frequentist problem: even if σa has a Bayesian
nature the problem can be stated in terms of an ensenble in which the Monte Carlo is
rerun many times. So it is technically correct. It gives the unbiassed estimate, in the sense
that averaged over many such estimates the bias will be zero.
3.1.2 Conclusions for errors on errors
There is thus no justification for adding in quadrature, and there is a possible argument
for subtraction. But to do this requires that measurements with σR′ > |R′|must contribute
negatively to the systematic estimate, on the grounds this compensates for overestimation
in other cases. (And the greater the inaccuracy, the greater the reduction in the error.)
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To be right in general you may have to do something manifestly wrong in an individual
case (a feature well known in frequentist confidence levels near boundaries.)
If you have a large number of such corrections for parameters a, b, c...z then this
approach may be arguable. But not if it’s unique. You will never get it past the referee:
you investigate an uncertainty and as a result you reduce the systematic error, on the
grounds that you might have increased it (or, perhaps, that in many parallel universes you
increased it?)
No, at this point statistical sophistication has clearly gone too far for plain common
sense. We therefore recommend Argument 3: that this error on error correction should
not be done as there is no sensible way of doing it. It can be left out of the reckoning if
small, and if large then more work is needed to make it small.
4. CHECKS: FINDING MISTAKES
Finding mistakes is done by thinking through the analysis in a critical way, something
often best done by consulting colleagues or presenting results at seminars. Such a critique
looks at what could go wrong, and at what checks can be done on the analysis which could
reveal mistakes. These checks are variations of the analysis, for which the correct outcome
is known, either absolutely or in relation to other results.
You can never prove that an analysis is perfect, but the more checks you perform
successfully, the greater the credibility of the result.
Such checks commonly include:
1 Analysing separate data subsets
2 Changing cuts
3 Changing histogram bin sizes
4 Changing parametrisations (including the order of polynomial)
5 Changing fit technique
6 Looking for impossibilities
This approach is shown, for example, in the BaBar CP violation measurement[9]
‘... consistency checks, including separation of the data by decay mode, tagging cat-
egory and Btag flavour... We also fit the samples of non-CP decay modes for sin 2β with
no statistically significant asymmetry found.’
4.1 What is a significant difference?
If an analysis is performed in two ways (say, using two different forms to fit a back-
ground function) then one hopes that the difference between the two resulting values will
be small; a large difference would suggest that the background subtraction was not be-
ing done properly. However it would be unrealistic to expect them to be identical. The
question arises as to what ‘small’ means in this context.
It does not mean ‘small with respect to the statistical error’. The statistical error
is probably dominated by the sampling process. But these two analyses are done on the
same data (or their datasets share a lot of elements), and so should agree much better
than that.
Suppose the standard analysis gives a1±σ1. A different method done as a check gives
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a2 ± σ2 We consider the difference ∆ = a1 − a2. The error on this is
σ2∆ = σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2
Suppose firstly that the estimate is a mean of some quantity x, and that the check
consists of selecting a subset of the data
T
S
Figure 3. Many checks can be performed by analysing a selected subset of the total data.
The two values are given by
a1 =
1
NT
∑
T
xi a2 =
1
NS
∑
S
xi
and the errors by
σ1 =
σ√
NT
σ2 =
σ√
NS
and the covariance between them is
Cov(a1, a2) = NS
1
NT
1
NS
σ2
so the correlation is just
ρ = σ1/σ2.
This gives the required error on ∆
σ2∆ = σ
2
2 − σ21
showing that the error is found by subtraction in quadrature of the two separate errors.
If the check is more general, perhaps using a different method on the same data, it is
still true that
σ2∆ = σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2.
The correlation ρ is not known, but limits can be placed on it [10]. Introduce (briefly)
a weighted average
a(w) = wa1 + (1− w)a2.
This has variance
σ2a(w) = w
2σ21 + (1− w)2σ22 + 2w(1− w)ρσ1σ2
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By choosing w (differentiate the above, set it to zero, solve for w and put back in) one
gets the smallest variance possible from a weighted sum.
σ2min =
σ21σ
2
2(1− ρ2)
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2
.
Now, in an estimation problem there is a limit on the variance of any estimator:
the Minimum Variance (or Cramer-Rao) Bound. This limit applies irrespective of the
estimation technique used. It depends only on the likelihood function, and its value σ0
can be calculated from it. This bound means that
σ2min ≥ σ20 .
Inserting the expression for σ2min gives an expression which can be rearranged to give
limits on ρ, and that translates to limits on σ∆.
√
(σ21 − σ20) +
√
(σ22 − σ20) ≥ σ∆ ≥
∣∣∣∣
√
(σ21 − σ20)−
√
(σ22 − σ20)
∣∣∣∣ .
Notice that if σ1 = σ0 this again gives subtraction in quadrature. In many cases the
standard analysis will be the most efficient possible, so this will be the case.
4.2 Checks that pass, checks that fail
The standard procedure for doing an analysis can be caricatured as follows
1 Devise cuts, get result.
2 Do analysis for random errors (likelihood or Poisson statistics.)
3 Make big table.
4 Alter cuts by arbitrary amounts, put in table.
5 Repeat step 4 until time/money/supervisor’s patience is exhausted.
6 Add variations in quadrature.
7 Quote result as ‘systematic error’.
8 If challenged, describe it as ‘conservative’.
This combines evaluation of errors with checks for mistakes, in a totally inappropriate
way.
Suppose a check is done, and a discrepancy emerges as some number of σ∆. You then
have to decide whether it has passed or failed the test. Your decision will depend on the
size of the discrepancy (less than 1 σ surely passes, more than 4 σ surely fails), the number
of checks being done (if you do 20 checks you expect on average one 2σ deviation) and
at some level on the basic plausibility and reasons that motivated the check (you might
accept that data taken in the summer were different more readily than you would accept
that data taken on Tuesdays were different.)
If a check passes then the correct thing to do is nothing. Put a tick in the box and
move on. Do not, as is practice in some areas, add the small discrepancy to the systematic
error.
1 It’s an inconsistent action. You asked ‘is there an effect’ and decided there wasn’t. If
there was no effect then you should not allow for it. Remember that this is a check
and not an evaluation of an effect.
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2 It penalises diligence. The harder you work and more thorough you are, the bigger
your systematic error gets. A less careful analysis will have a smaller quoted error
and get the citations.
3 Errors get inflated. Remember how the LEP experiments appear to agree with each
other and the Standard Model far too well.
One has to be careful. Contrast moving mass cuts by a defined amount to compensate
for energy uncertainty (this is an evaluation and included) and changing mass cuts by an
arbitrary amount to check efficiency/purity (this is a check and not included if successful.)
If it fails then the correct actions to take are
1 Check the test. The mistake may well lie there. Find and fix it.
2 If that doesn’t work, check the analysis. Find and fix mistake.
3 Worry. Maybe with hindsight an effect is reasonable. (Why are the results of my ruler
measurements different after lunch? Hey, the temperature’s warmer in the afternoons
- I forgot about thermal expansion!) This check now becomes an evaluation.
4 Worry. This discrepancy is only the tip of the iceberg. Ask colleagues, look at what
other experiments did.
9 9 As a last resort, incorporate the discrepancy in systematic error.
Just doing a whole lot of checks and adding up the results in quadrature to the
systematic error is making a whole lot of mistakes, some too lenient, some too harsh.
4.3 Illustration: an inappropriate function
Figure 4 An inappropriate function. The plots show (i) The data.
(ii) A straight line fit to the data. (iii) Additional fits to subranges.
(iv) Extrapolation of fits and the true function - note changes in scale.
Suppose you are using a calorimeter for which the energy y corresponding to a signal
x is actually given by y = x + 0.3x2. Measurements are taken as shown in the first plot
(measurement errors are suppressed for clarity). You fit it as a straight line y = mx + c
using data in the range 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and get m = 1.3 and c = −0.05, as shown in the second
plot. This is what you use in your analysis.
As a sensible check you decide to calibrate the subranges 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 1
separately. The results are different (as shown in the third plot). The slopes are 1.15 and
1.45, and there is no possibility that this is a statistical error.
You follow the procedure above but for some reason fail to spot that a linear calibration
is inadequate. You end up incorporating the difference of 0.15 as a systematic error on m
(with perhaps a similar systematic error for c, and even a correlation between them.)
11
Notice what a terrible decision this is. As you can see from the figures, in the range
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 this is far too harsh. The line with a slope of 1.3 actually follows the points
pretty well and this extra error is inflationary.
On the other hand, if this calibration is to be extrapolated towards x = 2 or even
x = 5, then even this extra variation far underestimates the calibration discrepancy in this
region. The procedure is far too lenient.
This illustrates the point that there is no ‘correct’ procedure for incorporation of a
check that fails. If you fold it into the systematic errors this is almost certainly wrong,
and should only be done when all other possibilites have been exhausted.
5. CONCLUSIONS: ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS
The following should be printed in large letters and hung on the wall of every practising
particle physicist.
I Thou shalt never say ‘systematic error’ when thou meanest ‘systematic effect’ or ‘sys-
tematic mistake’.
II Thou shalt not add uncertainties on uncertainties in quadrature. If they are larger
than chickenfeed thou shalt generate more Monte Carlo until they shrink to become
so.
III Thou shalt know at all times whether what thou performest is a check for a mistake
or an evaluation of an uncertainty.
IV Thou shalt not incorporate successful check results into thy total systematic error and
make thereby a shield behind which to hide thy dodgy result.
V Thou shalt not incorporate failed check results unless thou art truly at thy wits’ end.
VI Thou shalt say what thou doest, and thou shalt be able to justify it out of thine own
mouth; not the mouth of thy supervisor, nor thy colleague who did the analysis last
time, nor thy local statistics guru, nor thy mate down the pub.
Do these, and thou shalt flourish, and thine analysis likewise.
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